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FROM BALANCED ENTERPRISE TO HOSTILE TAKEOVER: HOW THE LAW FORGOT ABOUT 
MANAGEMENT 
Andrew Johnston, Blanche Segrestin and Armand Hatchuel1 
 
 
Abstract 
We show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first 
half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. 
However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by 
company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no 
attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of 
important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?dŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞƚhe 
directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important 
driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management 
of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and 
to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be 
traced back to these developments. 
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FROM BALANCED ENTERPRISE TO HOSTILE TAKEOVER: HOW THE LAW FORGOT ABOUT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 ‘,ĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƵƌŐĞŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĞǀĞƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞũƵƌŝƐƚĂŶĚ
the statesman. The human association which in fact produces and distributes wealth, 
the association of workmen, managers, technicians and directors, is not an 
association recognised by the law. The association which the law does recognise  W the 
association of shareholders, creditors and directors  W is incapable of production or 
distribution and is not expected by the law to perform these functions. We have to 
give law to the real association and to withdraw meaningless privilege from the 
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƌǇŽŶĞ ? ?2 
In this article we offer a new account of the implications of the Companies Act 1948 for 
corporate governance in the UK, focusing on its effects on the autonomy that professional 
managers had gained during the first half of the twentieth century, and claimed to be using 
to balance the competing claims of the various contributors to the corporate enterprise. This 
autonomy was accommodated but not explicitly protected by the law. We argue that the 
introduction of a mandatory power for shareholders to remove directors by simple majority 
in the Companies Act 1948 was an important driver of the emergence of the hostile takeover, 
which is characterised by wholesale replacement of directors. This allowed the shareholder 
primacy model of corporate governance to become established and supersede the emergent 
managerially-led enterprise that had evolved after 1900.  In doing so, we show that, rather 
than a pure market outcome, shareholder control over companies was a policy choice 
                                                          
2 Lord Eustace Percy, The Unknown State, 16th Riddell Memorial Lectures (Oxford: OUP, 1944). 
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imposed by legislation, which ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ŽĨprofessional 
management and the enterprise. 
The article draws on a historically-grounded account of the function of management, as well 
as archival research on the genesis of the Cohen Report that led to the Companies Act 1948, 
to make two contributions. First, it contributes to the theoretical debate about the role of 
company law in shaping corporate governance outcomes. We show that the 1948 reforms 
were a regulatory intervention which disrupted the pre-1948 governance arrangements in 
which directors (and, below them, managers) were strongly entrenched and to which 
shareholders had consented. Our analysis provides support for those who contend that 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ůĂǁ  ‘ƉůĂǇƐ Ă ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞconstitution of financial property forms such as 
ƐŚĂƌĞƐ QĂŶĚĂŵŽƌĞŵŽĚĞƐƚŽŶĞŝŶƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ? ?3 However, it 
goes further and shows that ƚŚĞůĂǁĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ
rights by rewriting the bargains struck between shareholders and companies. In doing so, 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇůĂǁǁĂƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌŵŽƌĞĂŬŝŶƚŽ ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?, in which the 
state substitutes its view of a desirable corporate governance framework for the outcome of 
 ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ-driven, market-ďĂƐĞĚƌƵůĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?4 As such, it is closer to the fears expressed by 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĂƌŝĂŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ-motivated regulatory interventions that will inevitably reflect 
the partisan preferences of dominant social interest ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ?5  
Second, it contributes to the historical debate about the causes and effects of the emergence 
of the hostile takeover. Previous contributions have suggested that the 1948 Act facilitated 
this by furnishing bidders with more reliable information, and have also highlighted the 
                                                          
3 P Ireland,  ‘Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Legal Studies 453, 
501, emphasis in original. 
4 M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Oxford: Hart, 2013) p 256. 
5 ibid at 92; Easterbrook and Fischel ƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘Unless there is a strong reason to believe that regulation 
has a comparative advantage over competition in markets in evaluating the effects of corporate 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ QƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌĚŝƐƉůĂĐŝŶŐĂĐƚƵĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƐ “ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ? ? “ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ůŝŬĞ ? ? F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991) p 32. 
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importance of the emergence of institutional investors in the post-war period. We add to this 
debate by arguing that the contribution of the shareholder removal power to the hostile 
takeover has not, to date, been adequately explored. The new powers given to shareholders 
made control of many companies suddenly contestable, as the threshold for director removal 
was reduced overnight to a simple majority. The effect was to transform managerial practices, 
sidelining the dominant managerial ideology of balancing competing interests, and ultimately 
acting as one of the key drivers of the emergence of financialised corporate governance and 
the social norm of shareholder primacy.6 Scholars have identified many of the costs of this 
shift, such as its impact on employee willingness to make contractually unprotected 
investments in firm-specific human capital, and reduced investment in R&D.7  This paper 
suggests that these effects were, in considerable part, driven by the legal changes of 1948 and 
the subsequent emergence of the hostile takeover, which disrupted the management-led 
enterprises that had developed during the first half of the twentieth century.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Part 2, we explore the historical emergence of modern 
professional management in the UK from the end of the nineteenth century. While the UK 
may have lagged behind the US and Germany in this regard, we show that this development 
was widely accepted, and was legitimated on the grounds that these scientific managers 
would seek to innovate and to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise. In 
part 3, we show that these radical changes in the management of companies occurred in an 
unchanged legal context and that the law never developed a positive conception of the role 
of management. Various familiar features of company law allowed the development of 
relatively autonomous hierarchies which could operate in this way, but the law did not provide 
positive support for them, refusing, for example, to allow boards of directors to give managers 
                                                          
6 S Deakin,  ‘The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 11. 
7 M Blair, Ownership and Control  ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? PƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?t>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬ ? ‘WƌŽĨŝƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
WƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Harvard Business Review 46 (September) 
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full autonomy. The dependence of managers ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ on boards of directors made 
managerial structures vulnerable to the later move to empower shareholders. In Part 4, we 
show that the company law reforms of 1947-8 represent a deliberate regulatory intervention 
into the control of companies which sought to put shareholders in control. The reformers 
ignored the emerging role of management within the enterprise and focused exclusively on 
the relationship between shareowners and directors. We examine in particular the origins of, 
ĂŶĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ŶĞǁŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐďǇƐŝŵƉůĞ
majority. Part 5 shows how these reforms contributed to creating the conditions for the 
emergence of the hostile takeover, characterised by the removal of directors and a 
reorientation of managerial objectives, from the 1950s onwards. We conclude with a plea for 
scholars to address the role and status of management in law, which is essential if post-crisis 
economies are to become sustainable and responsible.  
 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT IN THE UK 
The timing of the separation of  ‘ownership ? and control in the UK remains controversial. The 
conventional account, based on Chandler, is that family control of companies persisted in the 
UK during the first half of the twentieth century.8 Hannah has challenged this, arguing on the 
basis of London Stock Exchange data that the separation occurred much earlier in listed 
companies, so that, by the early twentieth century, a substantial majority of large quoted 
British industrials had widely dispersed shareholdings, but with the directors (and other 
founders) owning up to 33% of the shares.9  
                                                          
8 AD Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
1990) pp 288-9; B ŚĞĨĨŝŶƐ ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞh<
WĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Business History 87, 91; B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British 
Business Transformed (Oxford: OUP, 2008), Chapter 9. 
9 L ,ĂŶŶĂŚ ? ‘dŚĞ “Divorce ? of ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined 
global trends ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Business History 404, 417. See also GG Acheson, G Campbell, JD Turner, and 
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The extent to which management of UK companies was in the hands of professionals in the 
first half of the twentieth century is similarly contested. Based on an analysis of companies 
listed in the UK in 1911, Foreman-Peck and Hannah argue that the  ‘ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů
control in the UK was substantially complete before 1914 ?ǁŝƚŚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŚŽůĚŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞ  ‘by 
virtue of their skills, knowledge, and networks, and promotion or recruitment to the board, 
not becaƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĞůĚƉƌĞƉŽŶĚĞƌĂŶƚŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐƚĂŬĞƐ ? ?10 Similarly, Sargant Florence reports 
significant growth in the ratio of staff to operatives in the UK between 1924 and 1948, noting 
ƚŚĂƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŐƌĂĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƌĂŶŬƐĨƌŽŵŐeneral 
manager to foreman and charge-ŚĂŶĚ ? ?11 Against this, Chandler emphasises the persistence 
ŽĨ ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘commitment to personal ways of management was therefore 
ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚĞĚ ?.12 Likewise ?>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚĂƌǇĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐts left substantial 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŬŝůůƐŽŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƉĨůŽŽƌ ?ĂŶĚ
ĚŝĚŶŽƚŵĂŬĞ ‘ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐǁŚŽĂƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞd into the managerial 
structure. ?13  
Whilst UK companies did not have had the formal divisional structure so lauded by Chandler 
as the source of US competitive advantage, it is clear that, even where they were owner-
dominated, British companies were appointing technical general managers from the late 
1800s, and that craft workers on the shop floor were not doing all the operational 
management. These structures were certainly more ad hoc than those put in place by US 
companies,14 but to deny their existence is surely wrong. In 1896, Slater Lewis published what 
                                                          
N Vanteeva ? ‘Corporate Ownership and Control in Victorian Britain. ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Economic History 
Review 911. &ŽƌĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ,ĂŶŶĂŚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƐĞĞCheffins (2008) above n 7, p 197. 
10 J &ŽƌĞŵĂŶ ?WĞĐŬ ĂŶĚ>,ĂŶŶĂŚ ? ‘Extreme Divorce: The Managerial Revolution in UK Companies 
before 1914 ? ? ? ? ?2) 65 Economic History Review 1217.   
11 P Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry (London: Routledge, 1953) p 140. 
12 Chandler (1990) above n 7 p 240 
13 W Lazonick, Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p 
269.  
14 Webb, for example, ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ‘a hierarchy culminating in some form of General Manager or 
DĂŶĂŐŝŶŐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂŚŝŐŚĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ?: S Webb, The Works 
Manager Today (London: Longmans, 1918) pp 4-5. 
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Urwick and Brech describe ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŵŽĚĞƌŶ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĐŚĂƌƚ ?ŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?15  showing a hierarchy from shareholders to directors to chairman or 
managing director, with the latter above a general manager. The general manager sat at the 
top of a large hierarchy, with the works manager and chief engineer below and reporting 
directly to him. Urwick and Brech ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚďǇ ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŶŽǁƌŝƚĞƌŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
would have given a works manager any descriptions that left doubts about his inclusion 
ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?16 Even in companies that still had a dominant 
shareholder from the founding family who controlled the board, there was considerable 
delegation to professional managers, and the dominant shareholder normally ensured that 
those managers had the resources necessary to make the investments to carry out the 
strategic plans developed by the board.17  
This is not, however, to claim that the practices which emerged in the UK were ideal. Far from 
it. The UK did not train anywhere near as many engineers as the US or Germany, and also 
lagged far behind them in offering university training in management.18 With less formal 
hierarchy and structure, British firms carried out less industrial research, tending to rely on 
consulting engineers rather than in-house staff, a less effective method than carrying out 
research in-ŚŽƵƐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐ  ‘ƐŬŝůůƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ǁŝĚĞ ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ
                                                          
15 L Urwick and EFL Brech, The Making of Scientific Management Volume II: Management in British 
Industry (London: Management Publications Trust, 1949) p 81. 
16 Ibid p 85. For further examples of early organizational diagrams, see O. Sheldon, Philosophy of 
Management (London: Pitman, 1923) pp 118 and 121. 
17 See for example the case studies contained in MJ Lewis, R Lloyd-Jones, J Maltby and MD Matthews, 
Personal Capitalism and Corporate Governance: British Manufacturing in the First Half of the 
Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2011); M Richardson ? ‘ZĂƉƉƌŽĐŚĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚZĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞ
ŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨtŽƌŬĞƌƐŝŶdǁŽ>ĂƌŐĞWĂƉĞƌĂŶĚWƌŝŶƚŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚƌŝŬĞ ?
in M Richardson and P Nicholls (eds) A Business and Labour History of Britain: Case studies of Britain 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p 94.  
18 SP Keeble, The Ability to Manage: A Study of British Management 1890-1990 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), Chapter Four; Chandler (1990) above n 7, p 293; R Khurana, From 
Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) p 
 ? ? ? ?ZWŵĚĂŵ ? ‘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ':ŽŶĞƐĂŶĚ:ĞŝƚůŝŶ (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business 
History (Oxford: OUP, 2008) pp 583-5. 
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within the firm, and often exploits firm-specific knowledge emerging from the production 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?19 Accordingly, UK management clearly lagged behind their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions in fostering innovation through research and innovation programmes,20  with 
some scholars explaining this on the basis that British boards did not delegate enough 
authority to their managers.21 We will see in section 3 below that the law imposed limitations 
on the extent to which directors could do this. 
The professional manager was a new figure on the industrial scene, and his role had to be 
explained and legitimated. This process began in the UK around the turn of the twentieth 
century in the management literature, 22  which explained that professional managers 
furthered the public good by applying specialised skills, following an ethics of professionalism 
which required them to balance competing interests, and fostering the development of 
innovative capabilities.23  
First, as regards specialized skills, for example, Burton describes the general manager as an 
 ‘autocrat, controlling and directing everyone connected with the concern excepting the 
ƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĂƵĚŝƚŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?24 ,Ğ  ‘should be a highly 
qualified engineer ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘a sufficient grasp of all the departments ?ƵƐŝŶŐ ‘his general technical 
                                                          
19 DŽǁĞƌǇ ? ‘/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ?-   ? ? ?ŝŶůďĂƵŵĂŶĚt>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬ (eds), The Decline of the 
British Economy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) pp 194-9. However, Sheldon (1923) above n 15, p 44 
reported that, even in the UK,  ‘DĂŶǇ large firms have now instituted research departments, for both 
applied and pure research. ? 
20 DC Coleman,  ‘Failings and Achievements: Some British Businesses, 1910 W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Business 
History 1 pp 5-6. 
21 DR ^ŚŝŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů/ŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Business and Economic History 89, 92-4; :YƵĂŝů ? ‘dŚĞWƌŽƉƌŝĞƚŽƌŝĂůdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ŝƌŵĂŶĚŝƚs 
ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?(2000) 3 Journal of Industrial History 1, 8. 
22 For an essential overview, see J Child, British Management Thought: A Critical Analysis (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1969), Chapter Three. 
23 See for example Sheldon (1923) above n 15, p 26. 
24 FG Burton, The Commercial Management of Engineering Works (Manchester: Scientific Publishing 
Co, 1899), pp iv and 20. 
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knowledge and common sense ?ƚŽ ‘reconcile their conflicting claims, and direct them all to the 
making oĨĂƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞƌĞǀĞŶƵĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ?25 
Second, as for the professionalism of these new managers, Webb described works managers 
ĂƐďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĂďƌĂŝŶ-working profession Qarranging and directing the activities of a band 
of producers, including both brain-workers and manual workers, as to create among them the 
most effective co-operation of their energies iŶ ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?26 Other 
writers around this time were also linking professionalization to striking a workable balance 
between the interests of capital and labour. Elbourne referred to  ‘the co-ordination of labour 
with capital ?ĂƐ  ‘the outstanding problem of management today ? ƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƚŽ
ŶƵƌƚƵƌĞ ‘ĂƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨŐŽŽĚǁŝůůĐŽƵƉůĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ?27 Similarly, Taylor 
explained that ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇéƐĂŶĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ QĂƌĞŽŶĞĂnd the 
ƐĂŵĞ ? ?28  an idea which was gaining currency in management circles in the UK. 29  These 
emerging approaches were endorsed by government, with a 1919 Ministry of Reconstruction 
publication, Scientific Business Management, stating that: 
 ‘In the past management has often been somewhat mechanical in its tendency, 
ignoring the human element in production and distribution. Today, more than ever, it 
is realised that the welfare of the worker is not only a vital matter for the community, 
but also from the point of view of the employer a matter of expediency. There is thus 
the double stimulus  W ƚŚĞŐŽŽĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƉƌŽĨŝƚƐďǇŚŝƐ “ŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐ ? ? ?30 
                                                          
25 ibid at 24. Armstrong notes the widespread use in Victorian England of salaried managers who 
 ‘ǁĞƌĞŽĨƚĞŶĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐďǇƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?: WƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ‘ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚƌŽů
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ PdŚĞZŽůĞŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶĐǇĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůWƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?
(1985) 10 Accounting, Organizations and Society 129, 138.  
26 Webb (1918) above n 13, pp 3-4. For the parallel debate in the US, see for example, L Brandeis, 
 ‘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ WWƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚƌĞƉƌŝŶƚĞĚŝŶBusiness  ? A Profession (Boston: Small, Maynard & 
Co, 1912)).  
27 ET Elbourne, The Management Problem (London: Library Press, 1919). 
28 FW Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919) p 10. 
29 Urwick and Brech (1949) above n 14, pp 99-102. 
30 Ministry of Reconstruction, Scientific Business Management, Reconstruction Problems 28, (London: 
HMSO, 1919). 
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This balancing of interests gradually became more widely accepted as a public service ethos 
was claimed for management, 31  ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ǌĞŶŝƚŚ ŝŶ dĂǁŶĞǇ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚthat industry 
 ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĐĞĂƐĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ-owners for the advantage of 
property-ŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽŶ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?.32  
The final aspect of the legitimation of management was that it would develop the necessary 
innovative capabilities for the enterprise to be successful. Whilst we acknowledge that, 
compared to their competitors, UK manufacturers relatively neglected science, Burton noted 
ĂƐĞĂƌůǇĂƚ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘/ƚŝƐĐŚŝĞĨůǇŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐ
ŽĨŚŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚůŝĞƐ ? ?33 dŚĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ‘science-based ? 
industry was transforming the enterprise from a productive to an innovative organisation, 
driving organizations into the unknown, which demanded radical new competencies to devise 
innovative but sustainable strategies. For example, Sheldon emphasised the contribution of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌďŽƚŚŵĂŶƵĂůĂŶĚĐůĞƌŝĐĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?34 Managers required broad autonomy and 
authority because they were pursuing ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂůƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
the consequences of decisions cannot be known in advance, making collective decision-
making impossible. Modern managerial authority thus derives from, and is a response to, this 
radical uncertainty:  
 ‘Uncertainty leads to the tendency of the groups themselves to specialize, finding the 
individuals with the greatest managerial capacity of the requisite kinds and placing 
                                                          
31 Child (1969) above n 21, p 46; for a discussion of the parallel debates in the US, see A Kaufman, L 
Zacharias and M Karson, Managers vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American 
Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 1995) pp 114- ? ?DK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ?Contests for Corporate Control (Oxford: OUP, 
2000) pp 100-2. 
32 RH Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London: G Bell and Sons, 1921) p 111. See also R Marens, 
 ‘Recovering the past: reviving the legacy of the early scholars of corporate social responsibility ? ? ? ? ? ? )
14 Journal of Management History 55. 
33 Burton (1899) above n 23, p 28. 
34 Sheldon (1923) above n 15, p 46. 
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them in charge of the work of the group, submitting the activities of the other 
members to their direction and control ? ?35  
,ĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶĞƌůĞĂŶĚDĞĂŶƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ “ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚ
 ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶƚŽĂƉƵƌĞůǇŶĞƵƚƌĂůƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨĐůĂŝŵƐďǇǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?36 they were simply reflecting the previous forty years of debate about the 
role of management in productive enterprise. This conception of management became widely 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐ ůĂƚĞĂƐ ? ? ? ? ?'ŽǁĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂůŵŽƐƚĂŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ
dogma that management ŽǁĞĚ ĚƵƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ  “ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵƌ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?  ?ůĂďŽƌ ? ĐĂƉŝƚ ů ?
management, and the community)  W a dogma which is repeated indiscriminately in the 
speeches of right-wing company chairmen and left-ǁŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?37 Although Quail has 
ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘extent to which such thoughts found expression let alone influence within 
ůĂƌŐĞh<ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐŝƐƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ? ?38 Nichols, in interviews conducted with managers between 
1961-2, found evidence that this was done implicitly, with managers focusing on promoting 
the success of the company through economic growth, believing that this would produce fair 
outcomes for all contributors, and promoting social welfare through economic growth, rather 
than through an explicit focus on social responsibility in the form of a calculus of social costs 
and benefits.39 
 
3. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE MANAGERIAL ENTERPRISE IN LAW 
                                                          
35 F Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921) at 269. 
36 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1991 edition) pp 312-3. 
37 >'ŽǁĞƌ ? ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽŶƚƌŽů PdŚĞĂƚƚůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĞƌŬĞůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Harvard Law Review 1176, 
1190. 
38 :YƵĂŝů ? ‘sŝƐŝďůĞ,ĂŶĚƐĂŶĚsŝƐŝďůĞ,ĂŶĚůĞƐ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞDĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh< ? 
(2002) 5 Journal of Industrial History 1, 5. 
39 See T Nichols, Ownership, Control, and Ideology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969) pp 238-9. 
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These developments in managerial theory and practice occurred after the establishment of 
the legal framework governing the allocation of power in companies. In this section, we show 
that the growth of professional management was accommodated within existing and 
developing company law doctrines and practices, rather than positively supported by law. As 
company law gave considerable leeway to directors and prevented shareholders from 
interfering directly in business decisions, boards were able to shield professional managers 
from shareholder pressure, giving them sufficient autonomy to balance competing interests 
and to innovate. However, the law paid no attention to management, recognising the position 
ŽĨ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?but ignoring managers below board level. This meant that managerial 
autonomy was never guaranteed by law, a fragile state of affairs which was disrupted by 
subsequent changes to the law which empowered shareholders and contributed to the 
emergence of the hostile takeover (discussed in parts 4 and 5 below). 
 
(a) The legal conditions allowing the emergence of professional management 
There was adequate space within company law at the beginning of the twentieth century for 
professional management to develop. Contemporaneous accounts indicate that most 
shareholders did not participate in meetings, did not hold the directors and management to 
account ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ďǇ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐ ?.40 More importantly, it 
was extremely difficult for the shareholders to change the directors, which meant that, as long 
as management retained the confidence of the directors, they would remain in place and had 
considerable autonomy in terms of ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?41  The right of 
                                                          
40 JD<ĞǇŶĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞ End of Laissez-&ĂŝƌĞ ? ?London: Hogarth Press, 1926). For further discussion of the 
reasons for shareholder passivity during this period, see Cheffins (2008) above n 7, pp 123-30. 
41 As Marris pointed out, shareholders could only remove a senior manager below board level by 
threatening to replace a majority of the directors with their nominees. R Marris, The Economic Theory 
ŽĨ ?DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ?ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1964) p 16. This was practically impossible 
before 1948. 
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ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǁĂƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
articles (and so reflected the terms on which the shareholders had joined the company). The 
default rule provided by Table A was that directors could only be removed by special 
resolution,42 or extraordinary resolution,43 both types of resolution requiring the support of 
75% of those entitled to vote and actually voting in person or by proxy. 44  Nor were 
shareholders in listed companies in a better position: even by 1932, the London Stock 
Exchange only required that all directors of listed companies be removable by special 
resolution,45 so that only a shareholder with a 75% shareholding could definitely  ‘ŐĞƚƌŝĚŽĨ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?46 Recent research has found that 76.2% of companies incorporated in 1892, 
regardless of size, adopted the Table A default rule, requiring a 75% majority to remove 
directors.47 Companies such as ICI, Rolls Royce and Vickers Armstrong set the threshold as 
high as was legally permitted.48 Even if shareholders tried to bring about a change, ,ĂŶŶĂŚ ?Ɛ
2007 research shows that the directors and their associates normally kept between a quarter 
and a third of the shares upon flotation,49 which would have made their removal impossible, 
and gave them freedom to put in place credible, long-term management structures.  
                                                          
42 Companies Act 1862, Table A, Art 65. 
43 Companies Act 1906, Table A, Art 86; Companies Act 1929, Table A, Art 80. 
44 Companies Act 1862, s 55 and Companies Act 1908, ss 69(1) and (2). A special resolution also 
required a second meeting to confirm the decision by simple majority until 1929: see Companies Act 
1862, s 51 and Companies Act 1908, s 69(2). The Companies Act 1929 dispensed with the requirement 
of a second meeting for a special resolution. As Mr Justice Cohen observed, the directors tended to 
hold all the proxies for the general meeting: see Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Company Law 
Amendment Committee (London: HMSO 1943-1944), para 7071. 
45 Cheffins (2008) above n 7, pp 130 and 278. This had not been a listing requirement in 1906: see 
Rules and regulations of the London Stock Exchange (London: The Stock Exchange, 1906) set out in L 
ĂǀŝƐ ?>EĞĂů ?EtŚŝƚĞ ? ‘How it all began: the rise of listing requirements on the London, Berlin, Paris, 
ĂŶĚEĞǁzŽƌŬƐƚŽĐŬĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?The International Journal of Accounting 117, Appendix A. 
46 Evidence of Samuel Cash, partner in Vizards, Minutes of Evidence (1943-1944) above n 43, para 
10191. 
47 TW Guinnane ?Z,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?EZ>ĂŵŽƌĞĂƵǆ ? ‘ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů&ƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝ ŶŽĨŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?(2014) NBER Working Paper No 20481 pp 20 and 27. 
48 E McGaughey, Participation in Corporate Governance, Unpublished LSE PhD Thesis, 4th November 
2014 p 84. 
49 Hannah (2007) above n 8, pp 415-7. 
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Directors were also commonly entrenched through provisions in the articles. By default, 
ďŽĂƌĚƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƐƚĂŐŐĞƌĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŽŶĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƚŝƌĞ ĞĂĐŚ ǇĞĂƌ ďƵƚ
available for re-election by the general meeting by simple majority.50 However, this offered 
little help to restive shareholders because, as a default rule, it was avoided in a number of 
ways. Some companies made no provision for removal of directors whatsoever, which meant 
that the shareholders had to pass a special resolution to change the articles before they could 
vote on removal of directors.51 Before 1906, most companies made bespoke provision to 
designate one or more managing directors who were exempt from retirement by rotation.52 
In 1906, Table A was amended to reflect this practice and provided a default rule allowing 
companies to appoint managing directors, who were exempt from retirement by rotation, and 
this was rarely displaced.53 Finally, it was a common practice for the founders of the company 
to provide that they would remain directors for life or for a certain number of years provided 
they satisfied a shareholding requirement. 54  These strategies, which were adopted by a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ŝŶ 'ƵŝŶŶĂŶĞ Ğƚ Ăů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ƐĂŵƉůĞ ?55 meant that a special 
resolution to change the articles was required, followed by a vote to remove the director.  
                                                          
50 Companies Act 1862, Table A, Arts 58, 60 and 61; Companies Act 1906, Table A, Arts 78, 80 and 81; 
Companies Act 1929, Table A, Arts 73, 75 and 76 (providing for re-election by default). Guinnane et al 
(2014) above n 46, p 10 suggest that this was perhaps to ensure continuity in management of the 
enterprise. 
51 Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co v Hampson (1882) 23 C.D. 1; see also Report of the Committee on 
Company Law Amendment (Cm 6659, 1945) (Cohen Report), paragraph 130. 
52 In 'ƵŝŶŶĂŶĞĞƚĂů ?ƐƐĂŵƉůĞƐ ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐĂŵƉůĞŽĨĐŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ?
percent of their sample from ƵƌĚĞƚƚ ?Ɛ^ƚŽĐŬǆĐŚĂŶŐĞKĨĨŝĐŝĂů/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ (1892) made provision 
along these lines: TW Guinnane ?Z,ĂƌƌŝƐĂŶĚEZ>ĂŵŽƌĞĂƵǆ ? ‘ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů&ƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚŽƌƉŽĂƚĞ
'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂƚĞEŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĂŶĚĂƌůǇdǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Business 
History Review 227, 244. 
53 Companies Act 1906, Table A, Art 72; Companies Act 1929, Table A, Art  ? ? ?/Ŷ'ƵŝŶŶĂŶĞĞƚĂů ?Ɛ(ibid) 
1912 and 1927 samples virtually all companies adopted this provision. By default, the general meeting 
could remove a managing director or manager from his position by simple majority, with 44.9% and 
62% of companies in GuinnaŶĞĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŵƉůĞƐ adopting this provision. Presumably the 
directors could simply reappoint the managing director or manager in the unlikely event of removal 
by the general meeting. 
54 This was common where a business was incorporated for the first time: see FB Palmer, Company 
Precedents for Use in Relation to Companies Subject to the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 
(Volume 1) (London: Stevens, 1912) pp 981-2.  
55 Guinnane at al (2014) above n 46, p 20. 
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Nor did amalgamations and mergers during the first half of the twentieth century generally 
result in changes to the directors and managers.56 These operations proceeded consensually, 
with directors only departing by consent, and managerial hierarchies frequently remaining 
intact, particularly in the early, largely anti-competitive amalgamations in which individual 
companies remained separately managed under a holding company.57 This was a far cry from 
the hostile takeovers of the second half of the twentieth century in which a bidder explicitly 
sought to change the incumbent directors as soon as they gained control. 
These practices meant that shareholder removal of directors was, as an 1894 book aimed 
investors put it,  ‘ŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ QĂůŵŽƐƚĂŶŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?58 However, the effective entrenchment 
of directors and managers, with shareholders becoming increasingly peripheral, did not give 
rise to controversy, and was endorsed by the company law literature during this period.59 
Looking beyond removal of directors, shareholders had few other options open to them. The 
law did not allow them to interfere with the decisions of the directors. In a number of cases 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, the courts ruled that a simple majority of 
shareholders could not give binding instructions to the directors. These rulings were justified 
either by reference to the bargain made between the shareholders,60 or to the need to protect 
minority shareholders,61 or to the company as a separate legal entity.62 It is at least arguable 
                                                          
56 :&ƌĂŶŬƐ ?DĂǇĞƌĂŶĚ^ZŽƐƐŝ ? ‘^ƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ>ĞƐƐdŝŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ĂŵŝůǇ PdŚĞĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨ&ĂŵŝůǇ
KǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ŝŶZDŽƌĐŬ (ed), A History of Corporate Governance around the 
World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
pp 595-7 showing that, between 1919 and 1939,  ‘ŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƚǁŽƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚ ?ƐďŽĂƌĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?
57 See for example L Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London: Methuen, 1976) pp 86-7; 
Franks et al (2005) above n 55, p 584.  
58 JD Walker & Watson, /ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ'ƵŝĚĞ (Edinburgh: E&S Livingstone, 1894) pp 142-
3. 
59 ^ƚŝĞďĞů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ďŽŽŬ ƐŝŵƉůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚĞŵƉŽǁĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞ
directors by extraordinary or special resolution ? P^ĞĞ^ƚŝĞďĞů ?Company Law and Precedents (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2nd edn, 1920) pp 396 and 423. 
60 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; Quin & Axtens Ltd v 
Salmon [1909] A.C. 442 pp 443-4. 
61 See the decisions of the Court of Appeal in both Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 and Quin & Axtens Ltd 
[1909] 1 Ch 311 . 
62 The Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89. 
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that, whilst the judges were justifying their decisions on the basis of conventional company 
law concerns, they were in fact reflecting the emerging  W and widely accepted  W ideology that, 
in order for businesses to be successful, management had to be free from interference. 
Further support for this argument comes from the United States, which saw similar legal 
developments around the same time, but justified on entirely different bases. There the 
courts prevented shareholder interference with management on the basis that the power to 
manage was given to the directors by the law of the state of incorporation,63 or on basis that 
it would not be appropriate to hold the directors responsible to the corporation if they could 
be forced to act with others who could control their acts.64 Reviewing these developments, 
Hurst identified a minority shareholder logic, but also ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ƚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐďǇƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ‘ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚhe high 
value which prevailing opinion put on the entrepreneurial function in the growth decades 
ĨƌŽŵĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?65  
Likewise, it was very difficult for shareholders to challenge ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐbefore the 
courts. The law requiƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ďĞ ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
company ?,66 a concept widely interpreted as referring to the commercial interests of the 
shareholders rather than the interests of the separate legal entity.67 However, it was clear that 
the law allowed the directors to take account of and spend money on interests other than 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
                                                          
63 Hoyt v. Thompson's Executors, (1859) 19 N.Y. 207 p 216 ?ƌƵůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉŽǁĞƌƐĂƌĞ
 ‘original and undelegated ?.  
64 Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co v Dunsmore (1880) 60 NH 85; Manice v Powell (1911) 201 NY 194 pp 
200-1.  
65 JW Hurst, The legitimacy of the business corporation in the law of the United States, 1780-1970 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1970) pp 79-80. 
66 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654, per Bowen LJ in the Court of Appeal. See also 
Parke v Daily News [1962] Ch 927. Both these cases concerned the payment of gratuities to directors 
or employees after the company had ceased to be a going concern.  
67 See e.g. J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 1993) p 77. 
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ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?68 Recently, a number of scholars have challenged the conventional 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ǁĂƐŶĞǀĞƌ
defined by the courts, and that all these decisions turned on the narrow point that gratuitous 
payments were void for ultra vires because they were not reasonably incidental to the 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵ ?69 Marc Moore argues that the 
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĨƵŶĚƐĐŽƵůĚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇďĞĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽ
shareholders and/or employees as the directors reasonably deemed fit for the furtherance of 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ůŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ) ŽĨ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ƐŽ ůŽŶŐĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨthe 
business ĂƐƐƵĐŚǁĞƌĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇďĞŝŶŐƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇ ? ?70  
As well as according with the emergent theory of management as balancing the competing 
interests at stake in the enterprise and seeking to innovate, this new interpretation of the case 
law fits with contemporaneous theoretical developments in the legal literature ? ‘ZĞĂůĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?
theory was the subject of considerable academic discussion throughout the early twentieth 
century following its importation from Germany by Maitland in 1900, and its adoption by 
political pluralists such as Laski. 71  That theory emphasised the social existence of the 
corporate entity as a result of cooperative activity towards a common goal, with a strong 
                                                          
68 The directors had very broad discretion to make expenditures aiŵĞĚĂƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǁĂƐĂŐŽŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ PƐĞĞ ,ĂŵƉƐŽŶǀWƌŝĐĞ ?ƐWĂƚĞŶƚĂŶĚůĞ
Co (1876) 45 L. J. Ch. 437. In Evans v Brunner, Mond & Co [1921] Ch 359, this extended to funding 
scientific education in universities, considered by the directors to be essential for the business which 
 ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƉƵƌĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇǁĂƐƚŽ
find men sufficiently equiƉƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŽƌŬ ? ?The limits of the 
principle were only reached in Tomkinson v South-Eastern Railway Company (1887) 35 Ch.D. 675, 
where the court ruled ultra vires a spending decision ?ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐĂƐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂǀĂŐĂŶƚ ?ƚŚe argument that 
 ‘ĂŶǇĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĐŽŶĚƵĐĞƚŽƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝƐintra vires ? ? 
69 See for example, M DŽŽƌĞ ? ‘^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌWƌŝŵĂĐǇ ?>ĂďŽƵƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨh<
ŽŵƉĂŶǇ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? )University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 40/2016; J 
DƵŬǁŝƌŝ ? ‘DǇƚŚŽĨ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌWƌŝŵĂĐǇŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )European Business Law Review 
217. 
70 Moore (2016) ibid at 18. 
71 FW Maitland  ‘DŽƌĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ>ĞŐĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? (1905) 6 Journal of the Society of 
Comparative Legislation 192; ,>ĂƐŬŝ ? ‘dŚĞĂƐŝƐŽĨsŝĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ>ŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Yale LJ 105 p 134; H 
>ĂƐŬŝ ? ‘dŚĞWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Harvard Law Review 404. For discussion see R Harris, 
 ‘dŚĞdƌĂŶƐƉůĂŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ>ĞŐĂůŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽn Corporate Personality Theories: From German 
ŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůWůƵƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝŐƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1421. 
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ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ?Indeed, whilst not being in favour 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƐĞŵŝ-ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ? <ĞǇŶĞƐ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƐ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů 
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶ ‘ƐĞŵŝ-ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?72 
These rules and practices did not mean that the directors were entirely unresponsive to the 
shareholders.73 /ƚǁĂƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚŝŶŐ  ‘ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĨŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?74 and 
there is evidence that directors paid dividends steadily to shareholders during this period.75 
Hidden reserves were commonly relied upon to allow regular and acceptable dividends to be 
paid, so that dispersed shareholders of large companies, who had little access to reliable 
accounting information, remained passive.76 However, the practical effect of the law was that 
shareholders had little choice but to accept the directors and managers of the companies in 
which they held shares, and decisions were oriented to the interests of the organisation, and 
towards fairness to the various contributors to the corporate enterprise.77  
Compared with the current position, it is striking that directors and managers were central 
and entrenched, whilst shareholders had become peripheral.78 Entrenchment, consensual 
mergers, rules about shareholder instructions and the lack of judicial review of business 
                                                          
72 Keynes (1926) above n 39. 
73 Nichols (1969) above n 38 pp 78-9; P. /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ‘dŚĞŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?
in J-P Robé, A Lyon-Caen, S Vernac (eds), Multinationals and the Constitutionalization of the World 
Power System (Oxford: Routledge 2016) p 80. 
74 See FB Palmer, Company law: a practical handbook for lawyers and business men (London: Stevens, 
1902) p 151. In 1906, the London Stock Exchange required listed companies to have a director 
shareholding qualification in their articles. Whilst no minimum level was specified, in practice it was 
set at a level representing  ‘ĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐǁĞĂůƚŚ ?: G Campbell 
ĂŶĚ:dƵƌŶĞƌ ? ‘Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate Governance and Dividends in Victorian 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Economic History Review 571, 582-3. Mandatory rules in this area were rejected by 
the Greene Committee (see Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (Cmnd 2657, 1926) 
para 53). 
75 Cheffins (2008) above n 7, p255.  
76 Ibid at 295 
77 Nichols (1969) above n 38, pp 53-4; Keynes (1926) above n 39. 
78 For a rare example in which a managing director with a ten year contract was ousted from his 
position by a holding company which had acquired all the shares in the company and altered the 
articles, allowing it to remove any director by notice, terminating his contract and giving him a right to 
damages: see Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701. For further discussion see 
McGaughey (2014) above n 47, pp 83-4. 
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decisions created board autonomy, and allowed for the emergence of professional 
management who  W ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐĞĐŽnomics  W could specialise their skills to 
those of the firm and make credible commitments to those they managed.  
 
(b) The missing concept of the manager in company law 
The last section shows that the autonomy of directors in relation to shareholders was 
established by law and practice. However, the law had less to say about professional managers, 
being content simply to leave them under the control of the directors, and never developing 
a positive conception of the managerial function. In company law, managers were simply 
viewed as employees, 79  with a limited duty of good faith implied into their contract of 
employment,80 whilst in labour law they were treated as representatives of the employer.81 
The law allowed directors to delegate functions to managers, provided there was a power to 
do so in the articles, as there was by default,82 and its scope increased over time. As discussed 
above, the practice evolved of the directors appointing one or more of their number as 
managing directors to act as the head of management, and the courts recognised the validity 
of these contractual arrangements.83 Table A of 1906 caught up with this practice, giving 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƉŽǁĞƌďǇĚĞĨĂƵůƚƚŽ ‘ĨƌŽŵƚŝŵĞƚŽƚŝŵĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌďŽĚǇƚŽƚŚĞ
ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ Žƌ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? ?84 Responsibility for the actions of the managing 
                                                          
79 Quail comments that  ‘ƐŚĂƌƉůŝŶĞǁĂƐĚƌĂǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƐĞĞŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐ
representative of the owners as a whole) and managers (seen as employees). Firms were viewed as 
sets of operations carried out by employees but initiated and supervised by directors in a manner 
ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƌŽůĞƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ? ?Quail (2002) above n 37, p 7.  
80 Robb v Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 315, 317. 
81 PL Davies and M &ƌĞĞĚůĂŶĚ ? ‘dŚĞŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?ŝŶG Davidov & B 
Langille (eds), Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) p 278. 
82 For example, Companies Act 1862, Table A, Art 68 allowed the directors to delegate to individual 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŽƌĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?ǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƵďũĞĐƚ ‘ƚŽĂŶǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽn them 
ďǇƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?ƉĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŶŽŶ-executive 
directors. 
83 See for example Scrutton J in Nelson v James Nelson & Sons Limited [1913] 2 KB 471 describing the 
power given to the directors to appoint a managing director ĂƐ ‘a very ordinary one in articles ? ?
84 Companies Act 1906, Table A, Art 72; Companies Act 1929, Table A, Art 68.  
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director remained with him (as a fiduciary) and with the rest of the board, although the 
requirements of diligence on the other (non-managing) directors were not stringent.85 The 
common thread running through all these changes was that the managing director or manager 
had to also be a director, and so a connection was maintained between the board and the 
management through the person of the managing director or manager.86 Whilst there may 
have been considerable separation between directors and management in practice, it was 
viewed as essential for a representative of management to appear before the directors.87   
Faced with these changes in practice, the courts had to identify the legal implications of 
appointing a managing director, gradually moving from viewing him as  ‘ŽŶůǇ ĂŶ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ĞŶƚƌƵƐƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƐŽŵĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?88 to treating him as both a manager and a 
director,89 with his managerial functions determined by contract.90 In Horn v Henry Faulder & 
Co, 91 the court moved beyond managing directors and considered the outer limits of what 
could be delegated to managers. It concluded that, on the grounds of ultra vires, neither the 
company nor the board could, under standard articles vesting management in the board, 
delegate to a manager on terms that he would have full power to conduct the business (with 
the exception of capital expenditures and litigation) of the department without interference 
from the directors. Hence directors had to retain a residual power to intervene, consistent 
with the current idea that the directors bear some residual responsibility, via their fiduciary 
and common law duties, for the acts of the person to whom power is delegated. Likewise, in 
                                                          
85 ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞůŝĂďůĞĨŽƌ ‘ŐƌŽƐƐ ?ŶĞŐůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?essentially a lack of good faith: Lagunas Nitrate 
Company v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch. 392 per Lindley LJ.  
86 In Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [1936] 2 K.B. 403 at 413-4, 'ƌĞĞŶĞ>:ƚŽŽŬƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ
director is in a very different position to that of a mere manager since he is able to attend and vote at 
meetings of the board, and from the point of view of the company it was of importance that the 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐŝƚƐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐ ? ? 
87 See for example Burton (1899) above n 23, p 5, noting that sometimes the roles of managing 
director and manager were combined, and that it was essential for full reporting to the board to 
occur.  
88 In re Newspaper Proprietary Syndicate Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 349. 
89 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701; Goodwin v Brewster (1951) 32 TC 80. 
90 Per Lord Reid in Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 All ER 725, 738.  
91 (1908) 99 LT 524.  
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another case, the court ruled that, where management was delegated to a general manager, 
 ‘ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĚƵƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ  ?ƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚ ?ĐŽƵůĚĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŐŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĂŐer are those which 
ďĞůŽŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƐƵĐŚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?92 Hence 
there was a separation between the management function, which could be delegated by the 
board, and the control function, which could not. While these cases provided legal support 
for delegation of business decision-making and management to managers below board level, 
the management function was never positively defined.  
By interpreting the default articles as making appointment of management a matter for the 
directors alone, the law created scope for the emergence of the managerially-led enterprise. 
As we have seen, there was no positive conception of the role of management, and 
managerial autonomy was achieved indirectly, through a combination of entrenched boards, 
bespoke articles, and the non-interventionist approach taken by the courts. There was no 
significant opposition to director and management control in the legal and management 
literatures of the first half of the twentieth century, but equally, managerial autonomy rested 
on weak legal foundations. This, then, was the context in which the Cohen Committee was 
appointed in 1943 to conduct a review of company law. 
 
4. THE COHEN COMMITTEE AND THE COMPANIES ACT 1948 
 ‘Finding the shareholder a passing investor, we have insisted that he is an owner and 
a member of an electorate. Finding managements to be hirers of capital, we have 
tried to bury this disquieting fact by calling them hired hands of the shareholder-
owners. Finding "control" to have slid away from "ownership," we have sought to put 
the control back with the ownership where it "belongs." Pressed by the evident 
                                                          
92 /ŶƌĞŽƵŶƚǇWĂůĂƚŝŶĞ>ŽĂŶĂŶĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĂƌƚŵĞůů ?ƐĂƐĞ (1874) L.R. 9 Ch.App. 691, per Sir 
G. Mellish, L.J.  
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economic need for flexible centralized management, we have sought to decentralize 
decision-making ĂŶĚŽĨĨĞƌŝƚƚŽƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ?93 
The report of the Cohen Committee sought to put control of companies back into the hands 
of shareholders, paying no regard to the emergence of professional management described 
in sections 2 and 3 above. It recommended a number of regulatory interventions into the 
internal governance of companies in order to achieve this goal, including, most importantly, a 
mandatory right for the shareholders to remove the directors by simple majority. Its 
recommendations were implemented in the Companies Act of 1947, which was consolidated 
into the Companies Act 1948.94 These legal changes, along with the growth of institutional 
shareholders in the post war period,95  radically reoriented the h< ?Ɛ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨcorporate 
governance in the second half of the twentieth century. Together, they created the conditions 
for the emergence of the hostile takeover, which undermined the fragile autonomy of 
managers and sidelined the balancing approach.  
Driven by concerns about the quality of financial reporting following the financial crash of 
1929, as well as other corporate scandals,96 the Cohen Committee was asked to consider 
ĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽĐŽŵƉĂŶǇůĂǁ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶ ‘the safeguards afforded for investors and for the 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?97  Bircher notes that the decision to set up the Cohen Committee was 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇ QĂŶĚ QďĞƚƚĞƌƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐĨŽƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ
ĂŶĚƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ
                                                          
93 B. Manning,  ‘The American Stockholder ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?The Yale Law Journal 1477, 1490. 
94 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cm 6659, 1945) (Cohen Report). 
95 Cheffins (2008) above n 7, pp 344-5, noting that by 1969, retail investors no longer owned a 
majority of the shares of UK public companies. High tax rates encouraged individuals to sell their 
shares and invest in other, more tax-efficient assets, including pensions and life insurance: see ibid, pp 
81-2 and 341-9. 
96 P Bircher, From the Companies Act of 1929 to the Companies Act of 1948: A Study of Change in the 
Law and Practice of Accounting (Oxford: Routledge, 1991) pp 80-90; J Maltby,  ‘Was the Companies 
Act 1947 A Response to a National Crisis? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Accounting History 31, 38 and 47 
97 Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, p 7. 
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those of the shareholders, should have more recognition in the formation and conduct of a 
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?98  
Both investor protection and public interest concerns could be met, at least in part, through 
reform of disclosure and accounting. 99  The Cohen Committee modernised financial 
accounting. It proposed that companies should be required to disclose an audited balance 
ƐŚĞĞƚǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞƐ ‘ĂƚƌƵĞĂŶĚĨĂŝƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?and a profit and 
loss account, drawn up on the basis of defined accounting standards, 100  whilst parent 
companies should produce consolidated accounts for the group as a whole.101 The Committee 
recommended prohibition of the practice of creating secret reserves, which directors used to 
smooth dividend payments and keep shareholders happy, in particular because it distorted 
the pricing of shares.102 The Committee confidently ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘if fully informed, 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞƐƐĨŽƌĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐ ? ?103  
Beyond enhancing accounting requirements, however, the Cohen Committee gave almost no 
attention to other ways in which company law might protect the public interest as distinct 
from the interests of shareholders.104  Nor was the position of professional management 
                                                          
98 P. Bircher,  ‘Company Law Reform and the Board of Trade, 1929 W1943 ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Accounting and 
Business Research 107 at 116-7. References to the community and public interests in the mandate 
ǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇ ‘ǁĂƚĞƌĞĚĚŽǁŶ ? P ?ůŝĨƚ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŽŵƉĂŶǇ>ĂǁZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ? ? ?-
 ? ? ? ? ?(1999) Sheffield Political Economy Research Centre Research Paper No.1 pp 34-7. 
99 The Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 5, stated that its proposals for information disclosure 
ǁŽƵůĚ ‘ĞŶƐƵƌe that as much information as is reasonably required shall be made available both to the 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? 
100 ibid, paras 96 and 103. 
101 ibid, para 119. This recommendation was specifically targeted at protecting shareholders, who 
ǁĞƌĞůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŽƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ? ? 
102 ibid, para 101. This was a particularly controversial topic, and much time was spent discussing it. 
103 Ibid. 
104 It did propose giving the courts power to require, and making it easier for shareholders to demand, 
ĂŽĂƌĚŽĨdƌĂĚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ? ?Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 156) However, there was no proposal to allow any 
group other than the shareholders to demand an investigation, and discussions about the 
introduction of public shareholders (see for example, Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, 
Appendix M at 169) or company commissioners (see for example ibid, para 8134) during the hearings 
made no impact on the final report. 
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within companies ever discussed duƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?and it was rarely raised in 
any of the memoranda that it considered. Instead, influential members of the committee 
simply proceeded on the a priori basis that re-establishing shareholder control over directors 
ǁĂƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ?ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?Dƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŽŚĞŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘dŚĞ
view upon which company law is based, I think, is that the shareholders elect the directors to 
conduct theiƌ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶcomes ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?
money.105 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ'ŽŽĚŚĂƌƚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉŽŝŶƚŝŶĐŽŵƉĂŶǇůĂǁ ?
ŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?106 Other members assumed that the shareholders 
were the  ‘ƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚŽƌƐ ?of the business, leading them to assume that control should be 
reconnected to ownership in order to ensure efficient use of corporate resources.107 Finally, 
the trade unions, which might have pushed for changes in a more pluralist direction, had little 
meaningful input into the work of the Committee. Their representative frequently failed to 
attend meetings; 108  their memorandum and representations focussed on the role of 
disclosure in assisting with wage negotiations;109 and they did not make any submissions on 
more fundamental questions of internal control or worker representation, perhaps because 
these ran contrary to their adversarial approach to industrial relations. 
Given these assumptions, and in the absence of any articulation of the argument for 
protecting the wider public through company law, the Committee focused from its first 
questionnaire ŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƌĞĨŽƌŵƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ 
Žƌ ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?110  Its final report sought  ‘means of making it easier for 
                                                          
105 Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, para 7038 
106 ibid, para 9479 
107 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞDƌtŝůŵŽƚ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐĂƐ ‘ƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚŽƌƐ ŽĨƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?ibid, 
ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇďǇŝƚƐƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚŽƌƐ ?
(ibid, para 3682).   
108 Clift (1991) above n 97, p 44. 
109 See Memorandum by the General Federation of Trade Unions, Minutes of evidence (1943-44) 
above n 43, Appendix SS, and, for example, ibid, para 11274. 
110 Company Law Amendment, Draft Questionnaire for Discussion, Cohen Committee Archive, CL3, BT 
146/5 
25 
 
shareholders to exercise a more effective general control over the management of their 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ?111 dŚĞ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝůůƵƐŽƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚďǇƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŽǀĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĐĞŶƚƵĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚŝƐƉĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ? ?112 While the Committee recognised that  ‘ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌŵƵƐƚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇďĞǀĞƐƚĞĚ
ŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƵƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?113 it concluded 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐ  ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞƚŽŐŝve shareholders greater powers to remove directors with whom 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?114  
The Committee therefore recommended a number of changes which sought to empower the 
shareholders as a means of countering the separation of  ‘ownership ? and control. First, it 
addressed shareholder meetings, which were viewed as a crucial means of control by 
shareholders over directors,115 proposing mandatory minimum notice periods which would 
ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ?116 Second, the Committee recommended the introduction of 
mandatory rules relating to proxies which would override the articles and reduce the 
likelihood of the directors controlling all the proxies.117 Third, the Committee sought to make 
it easier for shareholders to propose resolutions at the general meeting,118 recommending 
that 100 members holding on average not less than £100 of paid up capital per member, or a 
member or members holding not less than 5 per cent of the voting shares, should be entitled 
                                                          
111 Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 5, emphasis added 
112 Ibid, para 7. dŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶĂƐĂŵƉůĞŽĨůĂƌŐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞ
shareholders owned less than 300 shares (ibid, para 124). 
113 Ibid, para 124. 
114 Ibid, para 130. 
115 Ibid, para 125. 
116 Ibid, para 126, implemented by s133 CA 1948. 
117 Ibid, paras 132-4, implemented by s136 CA 1948. 
118 Under Companies Act 1929, s114, shareholders owning not less than one tenth of paid up capital 
carrying the right to vote were allowed to requisition an extraordinary general meeting, and the 
requisition had to state objects of meeting. Directors had to comply within 21 days, failing which the 
requisitionists could convene it themselves, with the company repaying their costs. This allowed 
shareholders to propose resolutions, including special resolutions. However, the Committee 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ůĂƌŐĞůǇŝůůƵƐŽƌǇďĞĐĂƵƐe with the great increase in the number 
of shareholders it has become difficult for any single shareholder, or even for a group of shareholders, 
ƚŽƐĞĞŬƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĨĞůůŽǁŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?: see Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 128. 
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to require the company to send out ? ĂůďĞŝƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ? any proposed 
resolution or statement.119  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ Ă ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?
overriding anything to the contrary in the articles of a company, that any director, whether 
under a service contract or not, should be removable by an ordinary resolution, without 
ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƚŽĂŶǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůƌŝŐŚƚĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?120 Whilst the Committee was aware that 
the default articles and contemporary practice made it very difficult for the shareholders to 
remove the directors, there is virtually no discussion of this fundamental change in the 
minutes of the evidence given to the committee. In its memorandum, the London Stock 
Exchange recommended that the Companies Act should follow the Stock Exchange Listing 
ZƵůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ  ‘power by Extraordinary Resolution to remove any 
Director (including Life Directors or Managing Director with long-term contracts) before the 
ĞǆƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨŚŝƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? 121  Cohen simply responded ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƐŚŽƵůĚ
ŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚƉŽǁĞƌƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ ? ?122 There is no other discussion in the reported proceedings of 
the shareholders removing the directors by simple majority. An examination of the Cohen 
Committee archive reveals that a solicitor called Stephen Gordon suggested at an early stage 
that  
 ‘DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ĂƚĂůůĞǀĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞĂǀĞƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
entity which they manage and they tend to put the Company before the shareholders. 
The interests are not necessarily identical QIt is worth considering whether it is not 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽďƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŝŶƚŽĐůŽƐĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
                                                          
119 Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 128, implemented by s140 CA 1948 with slight changes to 
the time periods. 
120 Ibid, para 130 
121 See Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, Appendix X at 350. 
122 Ibid, para 6038. 
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ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞ Q^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂŶǇ
contract, to remove anǇŝƌĞĐƚŽƌďǇĂďĂƌĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŽŶĂƉŽůů ) ? ?123 
This suggestion does not appear to have made an immediate impact on the Committee.124 
Instead, it ǁĂƐ ƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚĞĚ Ăƚ Ă ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ůĂƚĞ ƐƚĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ. The 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚĂŶǇ ‘general alteration of the existing 
rights of shareholders, since shareholders could ascertain their rights at the time when they 
ƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞĚŽƌďŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĞŝƌƐŚĂƌĞƐ ? ?A number of their suggestions intended to prevent abuses 
of majority control125 were included in a memorandum summarising principal suggestions 
made to the Committee,126 and in a memorandum for consideration at meetings in early 
August 1944 ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘all directors should be subject to annual re-
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?127 It is unclear where the suggestion of annual re-election of directors came from, 
as it is not marked as a new suggestion, and there is no mention of it in any intervening 
memoranda. There was no mention at thŝƐƐƚĂŐĞŽĨ^ ƚĞƉŚĞŶ'ŽƌĚŽŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?In the event, 
at its 32nd ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂŶŶƵĂůƌĞ-
election Qexcept as regards directors under service contracts which stipulated that they must 
remain directoƌƐĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?128 The minutes of the 
next meeting record the abandonment of annual re-election, and ĂŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ  ‘to 
recommend instead that shareholders should be given the power to remove directors, 
including direcƚŽƌƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ? ďǇ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?129  The provision then 
remained in all further drafts of the report, supplemented by an annotation to the second 
                                                          
123 Cohen Committee Archive, CL 11A BT 146/5 (submission of by Stephen Gordon of Lawrence, 
Messer and Co). 
124 Unfortunately, the minutes of the first thirteen meetings of the Committee, BT 146/3 are missing 
from the National Archives. 
125 Cohen Committee Archive, CL 72, BT 146/5 
126 Ibid, CL 102 
127 Ibid, CL 142 (memorandum circulated for consideration at meetings to be held on Tuesday 1st 
August and Wednesday August 2nd, dated 14th July 1944, para 11(6)). 
128 Ibid, BT 146/4 (Minutes of 32nd meeting 6/9/44). 
129 Ibid, (Minutes of 33rd meeting 19/9/44, para 1). 
28 
 
ĚƌĂĨƚƌĞƉŽƌƚďǇŽŚĞŶŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƚŽĂŶǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůƌŝŐŚt 
ĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
appointed before the Act came into force ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚĂƌŽƐĞŝŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƐĂŶ
ĂŐƌĞĞĚŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ?130  
Apart from the statement in the final report that shareholders should have greater powers to 
remove directors, there is nothing in the Minutes of Evidence or the archive to shed light on 
how the Committee thought this rule would impact on the governance and management of 
companies. It is clear that the Committee was concerned about the impact of mergers and 
amalgamations on shareholders. As noted in section 3(a) above, before 1945, mergers tended 
to proceed consensually. The proposer negotiated with the incumbent directors to reach a 
settlement for their loss of office, in the form of either a seat on the board of the merged 
company or a compensation payment. In the case of a seat on the merged board, this was 
often a long-ƚĞƌŵ ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ  ‘ƚŽ ƌĞƚĂŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?131  whilst 
payments for giving up directorships could amount to a considerable sum,132 which the Cohen 
Committee viewed as a diversion of part of the purchase price of the business from the 
shareholders to the directors. 133  The Committee therefore recommended that these 
payments should be approved by the shareholders in general meeting, failing which the 
director would be obliged to distribute the funds to the shareholders.134 
                                                          
130 Ibid, CL187C [B], BT 146/11. 
131 Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, paragraph 10190 (Evidence of Samuel Cash, partner in 
Vizards) 
132 Hannah notes that this could amount to as much as one tenth of the purchase price: L Hannah, 
 ‘Takeover Bids in Britain Before  ? ? ? ? PŶǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ “Pre-History ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Business 
History 65, 72. 
133 Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 92. 
134 Ibid. Ultimately s193 CA 1948 introduced a rule requiring directors to disclose to, and obtain 
approval from, the general meeting ĨŽƌĂŶǇƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŵĂĚĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ ‘ďǇǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌůŽƐƐ
of office, or as consideration for or in connection wŝƚŚŚŝƐƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?Failure to comply 
would result in the director holding the payment on trust for shareholders who sold their shares.  
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More generally, the Committee was clearly concerned that it was very difficult to remove 
long-term or life directors who were no longer competent, but who had entrenched 
themselves through provisions in the articles, either upon foundation or during an 
amalgamation process,135 an area in which Cohen had practised.136 The recommendation to 
make all directors removable by ordinary resolution certainly made it futile for directors to 
negotiate long-term seats on the board following a merger. However, the decision to give the 
shareholders such a strong power to remove the directors went far beyond what was required 
to counter the problems of incompetence and value extraction during amalgamations, and 
beyond what even the Stock Exchange considered was required to give adequate protection 
to shareholders. Whilst the Committee probably did not intend to facilitate changes in the 
control of companies or hostile takeovers, its repeated expressions of concern for the position 
of small shareholders, focus on the importance of the share price and emphasis on the 
importance of shareholder control strongly suggests that it intended to bring about a wider 
shift in power from directors to shareholders.137 At no point did the Committee ever discuss 
the impact of this regulatory change on the professional managers who were increasingly 
dominating operational decision-making within companies. 
Nor did the provision implementing the recommendation generate significant controversy in 
Parliament. In the second reading of the Companies Bill in the House of Lords, Sir Richard 
Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and a Labour politician stated that it was a 
 ‘ůĂƌŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ-ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ƉŝĞĐĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ Q
                                                          
135 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ'ŽŽĚŚĂƌƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ QĨŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŽ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶŵĂǇďĞĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ? ?Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, paras 
5257 and 9481). Cohen pointed out that removal of life directors would require at the very least an 
extraordinary resolution (ibid, para 5148). See also the representations from the London Stock 
Exchange (ibid, para 6185) and Cohen Committee Archive, CL108A, BT 146/5.  
136 Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, para 10194. 
137 As Horace Samuel, who gave evidence to the Committee but did not discuss removal of directors, 
ƉƵƚŝƚŝŶŚŝƐ ? ? ? ?ďŽŽŬ ? ‘ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞƐƚŚƵƐƚĞŶĚƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨĂŐƌŽƵƉ ?ĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐ
a vested interest, are almost as difficult to dislodge as the pocket-boroughs of the eighteenth 
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? H Samuel, ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?DŽŶĞǇ (London: Pitman, 1933) p 120. 
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ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ? ? ,Ğ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƵƌŐĞŶƚůǇ
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽnship between management and ownership in limited liability 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŚĂƐƚĞŶĚĞĚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƐŚĂĚŽǁǇ ? ?138 He emphasised the 
role of the accounting reforms in assisting shareholders to understand their position, and a 
number of other meaƐƵƌĞƐĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƚŽƉůĂǇĂƌĞĂůƉĂƌƚĂƐŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞ
did not refer to the mandatory power of removal.139 In debates, one speaker appears to have 
confused ordinary and extraordinary resolutions,140 whilst another erroneously thought that 
the 1929 Act provided for removal by extraordinary resolution.141 There was some concern 
ƚŚĂƚŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŵŝŐŚƚƵƐĞƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽ ‘interfere too much with the proper conduct of the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ďǇ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?, 142  but the most vehement 
opposition came from Viscount Maugham, who ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ Ă ĐŚĂŶŐĞ  ‘ŽĨ Ă ŵŽƐƚ
revolutionary kind, and that its effect would be likely to cause a great deal, of harm in the 
ordinary day-to-ĚĂǇ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ?143 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŚŝƐ ŵĂŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽďůŽƋƵǇ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚďĞƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚďǇĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǁŚŽǁĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ
point about the three-quarters majority is that so large a majority as that will never be 
obtained unless there is some real reason for the removal of a directoƌ ? ?144 He also questioned 
ƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐŽĨŽǀĞƌƌƵůŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂůůŽǁŝŶŐĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ‘ƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƉŝƚƐŽǁŶ
ŵŝŶĚŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?145 and noting ƚŚĞ>Ăǁ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ
ďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚ ‘ŚĂǀĞĂŵŽƐƚŝŶũƵƌŝŽƵƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁŚŽĨŽƌŵĂŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?146 
In the end, the recommendation was embodied in s184 CA 1948, with a longer notice period 
                                                          
138 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 438, col 585-6, 6 June 1947. 
139 ibid, col 588. 
140 ibid, col 642 (Eric Fletcher, MP) 
141 Hansard, HL Deb, vol 146, col 969, 1 April 1947 (Viscount Maugham) 
142 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 438, col 619, 6 June 1947 (Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, MP) 
143 Hansard, HL Deb, vol 145, col 862, 24 February 1947  
144 Ibid, col 872 
145 Ibid col 863 
146 Ibid col 865 
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of 28 ĚĂǇƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽƐŶĂƉƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
director to make representations.147  
It is perhaps surprising that this rule was introduced by a Labour government. Maltby explains 
ƚŚĂƚ>ĂďŽƵƌǁĂƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽ ‘the creation of a new institutional framework to increase social 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? and, being focused on nationalisation of 
quasi-monopolies, did not engage with the process of companies legislation.148 In addition, 
the development of the welfare state may have prevented the Labour Party from worrying 
about the social implications of changes in shareholder rights and, subsequently, the 
emergence of the hostile takeover.149  
Perhaps because it was included in a couple of lines buried in the middle of paragraph 130, 
ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘ůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?the proposal was barely noted in contemporary academic 
commentary. Kahn-&ƌĞƵŶĚ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƐĂǁ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝǀŽƌĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ
ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĂƐ  ‘Ă ĨĂĐƚ Q ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŶ Đƚ ŽĨ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ? ?150 ŽĚĚ ?Ɛ
review of the Report did not even refer to it,151 whilst a 1951 analysis simply noted that  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝƐĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ‘ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĞĚĨƌŽŵƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚŝŶŐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
ĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?152 Gower wrote approvingly of the change in 1956 in dealing with one 
                                                          
147 Hansard, HL Deb, vol 146, col 727-8, 25 March 1947; HC Deb, vol 441, col 194-5, 28 July 1947; HL 
Deb, vol 151 col 955-75, 5 August 1947.  
148 Maltby (2000) above n 95, pp 47 and 54. 
149 ƐƌƵŶĞƌƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůǁĞůĨĂƌĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ QƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĞh<ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞŶƚůǇŽŶƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůďĂĐŬůĂƐŚ ? ?Bruner, 
Corporate Governance in the Common Law World (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) p 143). For detailed 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞƌŐĞƌƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ
1970s, see ibid at 151-60. It was only during the 1980s, with the rolling back of many of those 
reforms, as well as the weakening of trade unions, that those social consequences became clearer. 
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.  
150 K<ĂŚŶ ?&ƌĞƵŶĚ ? ‘ŽŵƉĂŶǇ>ĂǁZĞĨŽƌŵ PZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨdŚĞZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨdŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶŽŵƉĂŶǇ
>ĂǁŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Modern Law Review 235, 245 
151 EM ŽĚĚ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁ PReport of the Committee on Company Law Amendment ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Harvard 
Law Review 1258 
152 AB Levy, Private Corporations and Their Control Vol I (Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950) p 
167. 
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ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǀŝƚĂů ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽĨ ƐƚŽĐŬŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ŽǀĞƌ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐŝƚĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŵĂŶǇh^ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?153 However, 
like the Committee, none of these commentators appears to have anticipated the full 
implications of this change.  
This provision, which represented a deliberate policy decision to interfere in contractual 
allocations of rights, transformed the balance of power within companies. It gave the majority 
in general meeting full control of the composition of the board for the first time, and so shifted 
ultimate control of the direction of the company from the board (and, often, the management) 
to the general meeting, which came to be viewed as the ulƚŝŵĂƚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
ĂƐƐĞƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽ ‘ŚŝƌĞĂŶĚĨŝƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?154 It strengthened the position of 
those who argued that the board of directors was the representative of the shareholders, and 
weakened advocates of the real entity approach, who emphasised the company as a separate 
legal entity, and its long-term interests as the touchstone for good management.155 
However, its most important effect was that it contributed to the emergence of the hostile 
takeover, because it alloweĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞŽĨĨĞƌƐ ‘ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ŽĂƌĚƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?156  with a considerable degree of confidence that they would be 
successful and certain that, having acquired control of the general meeting, they would be 
able to replace the directors (and with them, the senior management). From the 1950s 
                                                          
153 >'ŽǁĞƌ ? ‘^ŽŵĞŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƐĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Harvard 
Law Review 1369, 1381, 1389-90 and 1396. However, he did not explicitly link the emergence of 
takeovers to s184 CA 1948. As Bruner (2013, above n 148, p 148) notes, Cohen himself, in a 1957 
lecture, appears to have ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽ ŚĞƌŝƐĞŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůĞ
ƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐ ?, although he did not explicitly refer to the contribution of the removal power. 
154 LCB Gower,  ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŽŶƚƌŽů PƚŚĞ Battle for the Berkeley ? ? ? ? ? ? )Harvard Law Review 1176, 
1185-6. 
155 However, this approach to management appears to have persisted among those managers in a 
Northern City interviewed by Nichols in 1961-2: see Nichols (1969) above n 38, Chapter 17. 
156 This was the Bank of England ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶ ‘dĂŬĞ-over 
Bids, Note of meeting at Bank of England on Friday 10 July 1959 ?, cited in ZZŽďĞƌƚƐ ? ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ
Responses to the Market for Corporate Control in Britain in the 19 ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Business History 183, 
184. 
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onwards, the argument that management should balance competing interests at stake in the 
company was rarely heard, as the focus shifted to prioritising the interests of shareholders. 
 
5. THE EMERGENCE OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER IN THE 1950s 
In ƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽŚĞŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞ
first wave of hostile takeovers struck British companies.157 Indeed, between 1948 and 1961, 
25 per cent of companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange were taken over by other 
quoted companies.158 However, the takeover did not just operate as a viable alternative to 
the consensual merger after 1948. It also operated as a transaction aimed at gaining a purely 
financial advantage for the bidder. Although some takeovers were carried out for industrial 
reasons, many takeovers during the 1950s and 1960s were financially motivated, as bidders 
sought to gain control of companies and remove the board in order to access reserves, 
liquidate undervalued assets or gain tax advantages. It is no exaggeration to state that the 
Companies Act 1948 ushered in the modern era of financialised, shareholder value corporate 
governance. 
What effect did the Companies Act 1948 have? Before its introduction, there were significant 
obstacles to takeover bids which bypassed the board of directors and were addressed directly 
to the shareholders. The bidder had to offer a very high price so that the directors could not 
say that the bid was inadequate. Shareholders, who had little reliable information about the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂƐ ƚŽ
whether to accept a bid from an outsider.159 More significantly, there was a fundamental 
                                                          
157 Charles Clore launched the first hostile takeover bids in 1953 for the Savoy Hotel and Sears: see D 
ŚĂŵďĞƌƐ ? ‘dŚĞŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶZ Floud, J Humphries and P Johnson 
(eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 2 (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) p 267.  
158 Hannah (1974) above n 131, p 67. 
159 See JB Tabb, Accountancy Aspects of the Takeover Bids in Britain 1945-1965 (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1968) p 10; Hannah (1974) above n 131, p 71 
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asymmetry between incumbent directors, who only had to control  W directly or through other 
supportive shareholders  W 25% of the shares in order to prevent a bid which would make 
changes of which they did not approve, and bidders, who had to acquire 75% of the shares to 
take control of the general meeting and change the board. As a result, consensual mergers 
were the norm, and hostile takeovers were virtually unheard of. Where they did occur, they 
were motivated by an industrial, and generally anticompetitive, logic.160  
Before 1948, it would technically have been possible for a takeover bidder who had merely 
acquired a majority of the shares to gain control of the board by refusing to re-elect the 
incumbents during two rounds of annual retirements.161 This, however, would have been 
unacceptable to a hypothetical bidder, as the incumbents would remain in control of the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making during that period, potentially taking decisions adverse to the 
interests of the new controlling shareholder, and any challenge would require long, expensive 
and uncertain litigation. Any bidder relying on leverage would have faced even greater 
difficulty. tŚŝůƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞƐƚŽŽĚĚŽǁŶ ‘ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇ ? ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨa change of 
control of the general meeting, there is simply no evidence of this type of change of control 
occurring before 1948. Instead, changes of control tended to result in directors retaining their 
positions, 162  or being paid to give up their positions, an issue about which the Cohen 
Committee expressed concern.163 Similarly, a new controlling shareholder might have relied 
on the articles, which provided a default power for the general meeting to increase the 
number of directors by ordinary resolution, to appoint a number of new directors to take 
control of the board.164 However, bespoke provisions would normally have made this fruitless. 
                                                          
160 See Tabb (1968) above n 158, p 11. In 1906, Lever exceptionally launched hostile bids for a number 
of his competitors who had refused to form a cartel with him, and another hostile bid was launched 
by John Knight Ltd in 1920. 
161 /Ŷ'ƵŝŶŶĂŶĞĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŵƉůĞŽŶůǇŽŶĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĂůůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌƌĞ-election at 
each annual meeting: see Guinnane et al (2017) above n 57, p 243. 
162 Franks et al (2005), above n 55.  
163 Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 92. 
164 See e.g. Companies Act 1929, Table A, Art 77; Companies Act 1906, Table A, Art 83; Companies Act 
1862, Table A, Art 63. 
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For example, many companies provided for the appointment of a managing director who did 
not have to stand for re-election by rotation, either for a fixed term or indefinitely.165 The 
courts enforced articles giving broad powers to managing directors, even where this 
effectively gave them a veto over board decisions, and so increasing the size of the board in 
accordance with the articles would not have allowed a new majority controller to take control 
of management from a managing director without altering the articles (which would have 
required 75%).166 Hence, being appointed as a managing director would allow a director to 
 ‘ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌƉŽǁĞƌŝŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ?,167 and the courts were content to allow this to happen 
in the name of managerial continuity.168 
Proxy contests akin to those by which transfers of corporate control occur in Delaware never 
emerged in the UK either, 169  probably because this approach would have entailed 
considerable risk for the would-be controller. First, before 1948, the directors tended to 
control all the proxies, with shareholders very passive, making any attempt to identify and 
lobby the shareholders at the very least time-consuming and expensive, and perhaps even 
impossible, given widespread use of nominees and no requirement to disclose beneficial 
ownership. Second, any attempt to remove directors entrenched by the articles would have 
required a 75% majority, and would potentially have resulted in litigation. The inevitable delay 
and uncertainty surrounding any attempt to take control of the board, as well as the cost and 
                                                          
165 Guinnane et al (2017) above n 57, p 244. Similarly, many companies provided that anyone seeking 
the office of director, except retiring directors or those chosen by the board, had to provide advance 
ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ‘ƚŝŵĞƚŽůŝŶĞƵƉƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐƚŽďůŽĐŬĂŶǇŽŶĞǁŚŽŵƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚ
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĨƌŽŵƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĂƐĞĂƚŽŶƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚ ?: see ibid. 
166 Clauses in the articles requiring consent of managing directors to particular decisions were 
enforced at the instance of a shareholder-director in Quin & Axtens, Ltd v Salmon [1909] AC 442. This 
effectively limited the powers of the board, because as Lord >ŽƌĞďƵƌŶƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
manage it in a particular way  W that is to say, they cannot do certain things if Mr. Salmon or Mr. 
ǆƚĞŶƐŽďũĞĐƚƐ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
167 Guinnane et al (2017) above n 57, p 244. 
168 In the Court of Appeal decision in Quin & Axtens, Farwell LJ considered the provision in the articles 
ƚŽďĞ ‘ĂŵŽƐƚƵƐƵĂůĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĚŽĞƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂŚĞĂĚƚŽůŽŽŬĂĨƚĞƌŝƚ ?
ĂŶĚĂŚĞĂĚƚŚĂƚƐŚĂůůŶŽƚďĞŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ? ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽŽƵƐƚƚŚĞĚŝrectors, 
ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? PƐĞĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ś ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
169 For discussion, see Bruner (2013) above n 148, pp 39-40 and 208-9.  
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uncertainty of litigation to challenge managerial decisions taken in the interim, would have 
been sufficient to deter most would-be bidders. Even if banks had been willing to lend, this 
would, in most cases, have ruled out using borrowed money to fund the acquisition of shares.  
By levelling the playing field between incumbents and outsiders, the 1948 changes radically 
altered the prospects of hostile takeovers, making it much more difficult for company 
directors to resist, and opened up a wider range of companies to hostile takeover. In the 
period from 1948 until the introduction of the City Code in 1968, the ability to take control of 
a company by obtaining a simple majority of the shares was a fundamental driver of the 
emergence of the hostile takeover. Whilst shareholders generally may have been dispersing, 
,ĂŶŶĂŚ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶ ƌĞůation to listed companies, noted above, shows that directors and 
other founders normally controlled around one third of the shares, with the directors 
themselves often controlling around 25%.170 This, of course, was sufficient to maintain control 
under the default  W and normally adopted  W rules of Table A. Once the law was changed, the 
incumbents had to win around sufficient additional shareholders to create an absolute 
majority. The new institutional shareholders, presented with the prospect of a capital gain, 
would be unlikely to side with the incumbents. Effectively, contests for corporate control 
became a race to 50%.  
Bidders could build up significant shareholdings through on-market acquisitions via a nominee, 
and it was very difficult for the directors to find out about this.171 In a number of cases, bidders 
built up positions of 20-25%, giving them a significant chance of acquiring a majority of the 
shares when they eventually launched a bid.172 Bidders could also use various coercive tactics 
                                                          
170 Hannah (2007) above n 8. 
171 ss95 and 98 CA 1929 required companies to maintain and make public a register of members. 
However, s101 provided that trusts of shares did not have to be entered on the register, making it 
difficult to identify beneficial ownership. The Cohen Committee made proposals to require nominee 
shareholdings to be indicated and beneficial interests of more than 1% to be disclosed (above n 93, 
paras 78 to 81), but these recommendations did not become law.  
172 As in the bids by Daily Mirror for Amalgamated Press in 1958 and Viyella International for Jersey 
Kapwood in 1966: see Tabb (1968) above n 158, p 191. 
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to put pressure on shareholders to tender. These included making partial bids or bids for 
limited quantities of shares,173 offering bonuses for early acceptance,174 and declaring offers 
unconditional without disclosing the number of acceptances.175 These tactics played on the 
fear of shareholders that if they did not tender, they would be locked in as minority 
shareholders, vulnerable to opportunistic value extraction by the new controllers,176 or forced 
to accept a lower price for their shares when they eventually sold. Bidders amplified those 
fears by threatening to implement Ă  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ? Žƌ  ‘ƉƌƵĚĞŶƚ ? ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽŶĐĞ ƚŚĞǇ
acquired control,177 whilst media reports of successful bidders reducing the dividend following 
acquisition served as a further warning to shareholders who were considering not tendering 
their shares.178  
The emergence of these practices presented incumbent directors, who normally had a large 
amount of personal wealth tied up in shares, with a dilemma, as the advent of a hostile bid 
threatened to turn them into minority shareholders, and also created a significant risk that 
they would be removed from their positions as directors (otherwise the bid would not have 
been hostile).179 They knew that, if the bid was successful and they had refused to tender, 
                                                          
173 ibid, at 188, identifying at least 13 partial bids between 1948 and 1965. For example, in its bid for 
Drake & Mount, Longman only offered to buy the first 10,000 shares tendered. There was no 
regulation of partial bids until the introduction of the City Code in 1968. 
174 ƐŝŶƚŚĞďŝĚŽĨtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌĂŶŬĨŽƌŝŶĞƌƐ ?ůƵď>ƚĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? PƐĞĞibid at 189 
175 As in the 1961 bid by City Centre Properties Ltd for Manchester Royal Exchange: see ibid at 192. 
The Revised Notes of 1963 required the bidder to disclose the level of acceptances, but this rule was 
subsequently broken by British Oxygen which declared its bid for Murex unconditional but delayed 
disclosure of the level of acceptances by six hours: ibid at 262. 
176 Bull and Vice show how, provided they acted in good faith, a majority shareholder could then use 
their control to withdraw surplus cash from the company by selling assets to it: G Bull & A Vice, Bid for 
Power (London, Elek, 3rd ed, 1961) p 227. dŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƐĞůůŽƵƚ ?ƌŝŐŚƚǁĂƐŶŽƚŝŶtroduced until 
1986. 
177 See for example the bid by Broadmead for Murdoch & Co in 1957 or the 1958 bid by Reynolds for 
British Aluminium, in which Reynolds warned shareholders publicly that it was close to gaining 
control, and that once it had control of the ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŝŶƐƚĂƚĞĂ ‘ƉƌƵĚĞŶƚ ?ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇ 
(Tabb (1968) above n 158, p 60). 
178 In 1963, Courtaulds took control of Bairns-Wear Ltd and cut the dividend from 10% to 5%: see ibid 
at 246. 
179 From a sample of forty-five takeovers between 1947 and 1960 (which did not distinguish between 
ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŝŶǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐ ) ?^ŝŶŐŚĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƌŽƵŶĚŚĂůĨ ? of the directors of the acquired 
company were dismissed within two years of the takeover ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůƐĞĞŵƐ
on the whole to hĂǀĞůŝƚƚůĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚĨŝƌŵ ?. A. 
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they would be forced to accept whatever price the new controller offered them, or to remain 
as a potentially oppressed minority shareholder.180 Beyond this, incumbents who were not 
willing to sell their shares had three courses of action open to them, none of them simple. 
They could try and take defensive measures,181  but these were circumscribed, first, to a 
considerable degree, by the courts and, later, completely, by the City Code on Takeovers.182 
Second, they could try to persuade the shareholders not to sell their shares by increasing the 
dividend, which increased the share price, but reduced the funds available for reinvestment 
in the business, and therefore also managerial autonomy, or by taking actions similar to that 
                                                          
Singh, Takeovers: their Relevance to the Stock Market and the Theory of the Firm (Cambridge: CUP, 
1971) p 149. These figures form a marked contrast to the findings of Franks et al (2005, above n 55) in 
relation to takeovers between 1919 and 1939.We are unaware of any quantitative study of director 
removal during the UK 1960s takeover wave, but indirect support for the development of a new 
threat to the position of directors and management can be found in the growth of structural 
defensive measures between 1950 and 1965, a dynamic which came to an end as institutional 
investors mounted opposition to this (ibid p 603, Table 10.8), as well as the post-bid defensive 
measures in companies such as the Savoy Hotel, and those which came before the courts in Hogg v 
Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254. By the 1980s, board removal appears to have been routine following a 
hostile takeover: in a study of hostile takeovers in the UK from 1985-6, Franks and Mayer found that 
90 percent of directors were replaced within two years of the bid, whilst for accepted bids the figure 
ǁĂƐ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ P:&ƌĂŶŬƐĂŶĚDĂǇĞƌ ? ‘,ŽƐƚŝůĞdĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů&ĂŝůƵƌĞ ?
(1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics 163, 167-8.  
180 This appears to have happened for the first time in the takeover by Fraser of Binns in 1953. The 
directors held 29% of the shares, preventing Fraser from using the squeeze out rules (s209 CA 1948 
required the bidder to have acquired 90% of the shares), but they capitulated once Fraser acquired a 
majority of the shares, and sold their shares to him at the lower price of his first bid: see Bull and Vice 
(1961) above n 175, pp 109-110.  
181 The directors of the Savoy Hotel Ltd appear to have been the first to have tried this: see ibid, pp 
29-46. 
182 For discussion of the scope of defensive measures under common law and under the City Code, 
see A Johnston,  ‘dĂŬĞŽǀĞƌZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ P,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚ dŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƚǇŽĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
66 Cambridge Law Journal 422. One further possibility was to give the directors weighted voting 
rights on a resolution to remove them, as permitted by the case of Bushell v Faith (1970) 1 All ER 53. 
However, there is no evidence that this mechanism was used in the UK as a pre-emptive defence 
against hostile takeovers. If adopted on incorporation, this would reflect the agreement between the 
founders (and indeed such clauses are widely understood as a means of protecting agreements within 
quasi-partnership companies), but it would be difficult to introduce such a clause after listing, as this 
would require a special resolution to alter the articles, and institutional shareholders would be 
strongly opposed to a measure that would entrench board members. This hostility can be seen from 
their opposition to the use of non-voting shares, which were used for a brief period as a defensive 
measure during the 1950s and 1960s, but were gradually eliminated by strong opposition from 
institutional investors and disapproval from the stock exchange (Franks et al (2005) above n 55, p 
604). This hostility presumably explains why multiple voting rights are legally permissible but rarely 
seen in practice in UK listed companies (ƐĞĞ:ƌŵŽƵƌ ?^ĞĂŬŝŶ ?sDŽůůŝĐĂĂŶĚD^ŝĞŵƐ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚ
Financial Development: What we are Learning from Time-^ĞƌŝĞƐǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?BYU L Review 
1435, 1459 fn  ? ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽůĞŐĂůŽƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŵƵůƚŝƉůĞǀŽƚŝŶŐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
between 1970 and 2005). 
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ŽĨĂďŝĚĚĞƌ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƐĞůůŝŶŐŽĨĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĨƌĞĞŚŽůĚƐƚŽĂŶŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂŶĚůĞĂƐŝŶŐ 
them back.183 Third, they could launch their own bid for control of the majority of the shares 
if they had, or could obtain, sufficient funds,184 or they could persuade a friendlier company 
(which might let them retain their place on the board) to bid for the company. Fourth, they 
ĐŽƵůĚ  ‘ƌĞŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝƌƌĞŵŽǀĂďůĞ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? ďǇ ŝƐƐƵŝŶŐ ŶŽŶ-voting 
shares, a practice which was  ‘ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ ĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ?by 1962, had recently 
 ‘ďĞĐŽŵĞĂŵĂũŽƌŝƐƐƵĞ ? ?185 As directors focused on the threat of takeover and increasing the 
share price, the idea that the role of management was to balance competing interests and to 
foster innovation largely disappeared from public debate after 1948.  
Beyond s184, a number of other drivers of the emergence of the hostile takeover in the early 
1950s have been identified ?,ĂŶŶĂŚ ?Ɛ ‘ƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŚŽƐƚŝůĞďŝĚ
to emerge sooner was the poor quality of accounting information before 1948, and it was only 
following the accounting reforms that bidders could gain access to reliable accounting 
information without the cooperation of the target.186 Those changes also made shareholders 
less dependent on the advice given to them by the directors, who had less of an informational 
advantage than previously.187 Taxation played a role too, with company directors, in the face 
of rising taxes on profits, dramatically reducing distributions to shareholders in order to 
 ‘ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĨůŽǁŽĨĨƵŶĚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?, depressing share prices  and making 
companies with large quantities of liquid assets more attractive to bidders. At the same time, 
bids were attractive to shareholders because, by selling their shares, they could obtain a tax-
                                                          
183 In 1960, British Drug Houses responded to a bid by doubling its dividend, whilst in 1962, Waterlow 
& Sons Ltd responded by selling off its head office and distributing the proceeds to shareholders: see 
Tabb (1968) above n 158, pp 61-2.  
184 The first example of this appears to be the contested takeover in 1955 of Millspaugh by Hadfields. 
The rival bidder was defeated once Hadfields obtained a majority of the shares. See Bull and Vice 
(1961) above n 175, pp 166-183. 
185 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, June 1962), Note of Dissent, paras 6 and 9 
(Jenkins Committee). 
186 Hannah (1974) above n 131, pp 69-71 and 75. 
187 Ibid at 70-1 
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free capital gain rather than dividends which were subject to income tax at very high levels.188 
Similarly, as private individuals sold their shares during the 1950s and 1960s to institutions, 
dispersal of shares increased, creating a necessary condition for the emergence of the hostile 
bidder who sought to buy control on the market rather than through a private acquisition of 
a controlling stake. Moreover, the rapid growth in institutional investment from the 1950s 
onwards ensured that bidders were increasingly approaching fund managers who were not 
aligned with management, but who tended to be passive in matters of corporate 
governance,189 and would be likely to sell out their holdings in return for a premium.190 Indeed, 
the possibility of hostile takeovers was probably one of the main reasons why institutional 
investors were willing and able to remain passive throughout the period from the 1960s to 
the 1980s.  
Whilst all these factors contributed to the emergence of the hostile takeover after 1948, the 
contribution of s184 has not received sufficient attention. Hannah rejected the argument that 
the new power of the majority to remove the directors facilitated the emergence of the hostile 
takeover on the basis that the Stock Exchange already required listed companies to have a 
term equivalent to Art 80 of Table A 1929 in their articles.191 However, that provision only 
required that directors be removable by extraordinary resolution, that is, by a 75% majority. 
The dissenting minority of the Jenkins Committee, led by Gower, implicitly identified its 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐ ? ? ? ? ‘ƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶ
                                                          
188 Bull and Vice (1961) above n 175, pp 16-18. For details of marginal tax rates of top rate taxpayers 
during this period, see Cheffins (2008) above n 7, p 342. 
189 The Wilson Report concluded that the extent of direct contact between institutions and companies 
 ‘ǀĂƌŝĞƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇ ? ?see Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Cmnd 7937, 1980), 
para 900). In 1989, in a Bank of England discussion paper, Charkham concluded that while dialogue 
ĚŝĚŽĐĐƵƌ ‘ŽŶŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ ? ?ŵŽƐƚƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŚĂĚ ‘ĂůůďƵƚ Ă ĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇ ? ?:ŚĂƌŬŚĂŵ ? ‘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞDĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌ
ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ PƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ZŽůĞ ?Bank of England Discussion Paper No 44, November 
1989, 4. 
190 We are grateful to John Quail for suggesting this point. Franks et al (2005, above n 55, p 586) 
highlight the ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ QŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐƵŶƵƐƵĂůůǇĂĐƚŝǀĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ? 
191 Hannah (1974) above n 131, p 5 fn 69. 
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ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ QǁĂƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚďǇĞŶĂďůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂŶǇĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĂŶǇ
ƚŝŵĞďǇŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇǀŽƚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ a take-over bidder will obtain control by 
acquiring these votes has caused directors to pay greater heed to the interests of 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?192 More recent commentary has begun to focus on the significance of this legal 
change. In his 2008 historical account of the separation of ownership and control, Cheffins 
noted that this provision of the Companies Act  ? ? ? ? ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŽŶƚŚŽƐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĞůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞďŝĚĚĞƌƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?193 Bruner notes that the new rule 
 ‘ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ǁŽƵůĚ-be acquirers to achieve substantial governance power through open-
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŚĂƌĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ? ?194 Moore has gone the furthest in recognising the importance of this 
right, describing ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ‘ƐŚŽƚŐƵŶƌŝŐŚƚ ? as ƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůĞŐĂů-institutional 
factor underlying the centrality of the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌǁĞĂůƚŚ-ŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƌŵ ? ? ?195 
By changing the thresholds for control of the board, and with it, the management, s184 played 
a critical role in allowing the hostile takeover to become an established practice, the 
legitimacy of which was no longer questioned by policy-makers after the mid-1950s. It 
gradually gained approval, first from commentators,196 then from the City of London and the 
Bank of England,197 and, finally, in 1962, from the Jenkins Company Law Review Committee, 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚ ƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ŽĨ ĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?198  The dissenting 
                                                          
192 Jenkins Committee, Note of Dissent, (1962) above n 184, paras 4 and 7. 
193 Cheffins (2008) above n 7, pp 76 and 363. At p 332, Cheffins notes that the new right of the 
majority to dismiss directors before the end of their term was stricter than the stock exchange 
requirements. 
194 Bruner (2013) above n 148, p 147. 
195 Moore (2013) above n 3, p 212. 
196 In 1954, The Economist argued that if companies have financed themselves through retained 
ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƌĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽǇŝĞůĚƚŚĞŝƌďĞƐƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƚƵƌŶ ?ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŶĞǀĞƌǁŝůůďĞǁŝůůďĞ ?ŽƌŶĞĞĚŶŽƚďĞ ? “ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ĂƚĂůů ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞďŝĚĚĞƌǁŝůůĚĞĨeated. But if the 
ĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚǇŝĞůĚŝŶŐĂƉƌŽƉĞƌƌĞƚƵƌŶ ?ƚŚĞŶĞǀĞŶƚŚĞďŝĚĚĞƌǁŚŽ “ŵĞƌĞůǇ ?ǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽƚĂŬĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞŵǁŝůůŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇďĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?(The Economist, 23rd 
January 1954, p254). In 1961, Bull and VŝĐĞĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďŝĚĚĞƌŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƵƐĞŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ‘ŵĂŶǇďŽĂƌĚƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚŚĂǀĞƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĂĚŽƉƚ
excessively long-ƚĞƌŵƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞƐ ? ?ƵůůĂŶĚsŝĐĞ(1961) above n 175, pp 25-6. 
197 In 1953, the Bank of England had expressed opposition to the emerging hostile takeover, but by 
1958 had given its approval: see Roberts (1992) above n 155, pp 187 and 191. 
198 Jenkins Committee (1962) above n 184, para 265.  
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minority of that Committee added the further gloss that takeovers were a spur to managerial 
efficiency.199 By 1963, the efficiency-enhancing effects of takeovers were beginning to be 
theorised by economists,200 and in 1965, Manne introduced the theory of the market for 
corporate control to the United States.201 In 1968, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
was introduced, normalising the hostile takeover by precluding directors from taking any 
action to frustrate bids and removing the uncertainty that surrounded the common law 
approach to defensive measures. 202  The autonomy of directors and managers had been 
truncated, and from then on, their primary focus was, of necessity, the interest of 
shareholders as expressed by the share price. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have argued that, during the first half of the century, companies were 
moving towards an enterprise model, with professional managers balancing the competing 
interests of the various groups and fostering innovation in pursuit of the public good. In this 
new enterprise, the shareholders had become peripheral and passive, temporary holders of 
claims on the company, whilst hierarchies of directors and managers were virtually permanent, 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ, their own shareholdings ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ƌĞĨƵƐĂů ƚo 
interfere in the way companies were run. In other words, this evolution of the enterprise 
occurred within the existing legal context. Company law granted great leeway to directors, 
allowing them to nominate managers to run the company in their place, subject only to 
                                                          
199 Ibid, Note of Dissent, para 9:  ‘ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐǁŚŽhave treated their shareholders fairly and 
ĨƌĂŶŬůǇƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞůŝƚƚůĞƚŽĨĞĂƌĨƌŽŵĂƌĂŝĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞŵŽƚĞƌŝƐŬ ?ďǇŝƐƐƵŝŶŐŶŽŶ-ǀŽƚŝŶŐƐŚĂƌĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶƚŽĂƐĞůĨ-
perpetuating oligarcŚǇ ? ? 
200 ZDĂƌƌŝƐ ? ‘DŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞ “DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ?ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) Quarterly Journal of Economics 185, 
190. 
201 HG Manne,  ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control ? ? ? ? ? ? )73 Journal of Political Economy 
110. 
202 Johnston (2008) above n 181. 
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residual control. However, the role of management was never really considered by the law, 
and managers were never given legal guarantees of the autonomy which was required if they 
were to fulfil the functions claimed for them in the burgeoning management literature.  
The 1948 reforms contributed significantly to a reduction of the fragile autonomy of 
management, and with it, the potential of the enterprise to balance competing interests and 
to innovate. They disrupted these hierarchical structures (to which the shareholders had 
impliedly consented) with the introduction of a mandatory statutory rule (highly unusual in 
the company law context) which allowed the removal of the directors by simple majority, 
ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛarticles. This article has shown that shareholder control 
represents a regulatory and policy choice rather than a market outcome. This choice was little 
debated in Parliament, and its instigators fell back on unjustified assumptions that 
shareholder control was essential. Efficiency-based justifications of company law only came 
ůĂƚĞƌ ? ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ? ĂƐ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ƉƵƚƐ ŝƚ ?  ‘to defend and legitimate the rights and privileges of 
rentier shareholders ? ?203 
This article has begun the task of showing what was lost in this change. Companies became 
single purpose, financial entities, having control over, but providing little positive support for, 
the business enterprise. The capacity of management to take account of the impacts of their 
decisions on a range of interests was greatly reduced as they were forced by the threat of 
takeover to prioritise the immediate financial interests of shareholders. dŚŝƐ ‘ďƌĂĐŬĞƚŝŶŐ ?204 of 
company law in the name of greater director accountability to shareholders produced a 
number of adverse side-effects in the second half of the twentieth century, including short-
termism and a lack of investment in R&D and innovation, side-effects which continue to the 
present day. Yet there is little or no appetite for fundamental reform to the scope of company 
                                                          
203 P Ireland,  ‘ĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞŶƚŝĞƌ PŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚZĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ŝŶ
A Gamble, G Kelly and J Parkinson (eds) The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford: Hart, 2001) pp 
144-5 
204 L JohŶƐŽŶ ? ‘EĞǁƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1713, 1715. 
44 
 
law. Policy-makers are discussing restoring trust in companies through indirect measures such 
as country-by-country tax reporting, or through stakeholder advisory panels. We would 
suggest that more fruitful avenues may be found by revisiting the management literature of 
the first half of the twentieth century, and finding new ways to guarantee autonomy within a 
framework of accountability. 
  
